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INTRODUCTION
Historically, markets have almost always fallen short of
satisfying the conditions for and providing consumers with the
benefits of perfect competition. Certain characteristics of electronic
markets, however, enhance the possibility that e-commercel will be
conducted in an environment that comes closer to attaining the per-
fectly competitive ideal than that of most conventional markets.
Essentially, technology analogous to that which users al-
ready employ to search the Internet can also enable this retailing
revolution by allowing consumers easily to obtain comparative
product and pricing information. However, for a number of reasons,
on-line merchants (e-tailers), are asserting a variety of legal claims
that, if successful, will hamper consumers' abilities to use the most
efficient tools to obtain this information. In particular, if courts
adjudicating these claims apply existing property law governing
1. The stakes are high. While business-to-consumer commerce remains a small part of
overall retail sales (.64% in the fourth quarter of 1999 ("4Q99")), it approximated an absolute
value of $5.3 billion in 4Q99 and continues to grow. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL
ECONOMY 2000 9 (2000).
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tangible items to Internet activities without considering that me-
dium's unique nature, they may inadvertently, but nevertheless
effectively, confer upon web site owners exclusive rights to their
product and pricing information tantamount to ownership.
One of the requisites for perfect competition is the costless
exchange of information. If e-tailers can control the most efficient
means of access to and the accompanying dissemination of their
product and pricing information, they may impede movement to-
ward the ideal. Why would they seek this control and how should
the law respond? The answers to these questions, particularly the
latter, will largely determine the nature of competition on the
Internet, including the balance of power between producers and
consumers.
Part I of this Article explains the theory of perfect competi-
tion, and both why the Internet could facilitate it and why it appar-
ently has not yet done so. Part II considers why and how some sites
are seeking to protect their otherwise publicly available product
and pricing information from particularly those users obtaining it
through automated means. Some of these sites' motivations are
anti-competitive while others are not. The law must consider how
best to structure competition on the Internet in light of both these
conflicting purposes and the interests of consumers in having easy
access to such information.
Part III examines the legal landscape, analyzing some of the
claims sites are raising. This evaluation reveals the inadequacies of
simply applying existing law to new technology. Part IV proposes a
test to address complaints arguing that unwanted visits to a web
site should be legally prohibited. It then briefly considers the
broader normative question: "What should e-commerce look like?"
Part IV concludes by contending that, at this early state of Internet
technology, policymakers would do better to err on the side of
weaker rather than stronger property rights. This decisional
framework may change over time as the market develops, but pro-
vides a reasonable starting point.
I. PERFECT COMPETITION-THEORY AND THE INTERNET
REALITY
The textbook definition of perfect competition is "[a] market
structure in which all firms in an industry are price takers and in
which there is freedom of entry into and exit from the industry."2 A
2. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 915 (8th ed. 1987).
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perfectly competitive market is one characterized not only by no
barriers to entry or exit, but also homogeneous products and per-
fectly informed buyers and sellers able to meet with each other
without incurring search or other transaction costs. 3 In such a mar-
ket, price equals marginal cost,4 keeping supply and demand in
equilibrium.5
Most markets are not perfectly competitive. Real barriers to
entry and exit exist, products are differentiated, information
asymmetries persist, and transaction costs are non-trivial.6 The
relative strength of these factors' variations from the ideal deter-
mines where a market fits in the range between perfect competition
and the other end of the spectrum-monopoly, where industry out-
put is controlled by a single source that may price above marginal
cost, imposing deadweight losses on consumers. 7 A change to a
market that brings it closer to perfect competition is generally
viewed as desirable. 8
3. See Frictions in Cyberspace, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 94 (describing an "ideal com-
petitive market" as one in which "products are identical, customers are perfectly informed, there
is free market entry, a large number of buyers and sellers and no search costs"); How to Be Per-
fect, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2000, at 82
[A perfect market] would allow all buyers and sellers to meet together, with full
information about supply and demand. There would be no barriers to entering
or leaving the market. And every buyer would be matched with the supplier
that could best meet his needs .... And there would be no 'transaction costs,'
such as time wasted seeking the right product.
Id.
4. Marginal cost is "[t]he increase in total cost resulting from raising the rate of production
by one unit. Mathematically, [it is] the rate of change of cost with respect to output." LIPSEY ET
AL., supra note 2, at 913.
5. See Frictions in Cyberspace, supra note 3; How to Be Perfect, supra note 3.
6. See How to Be Perfect, supra note 3 (explaining that while some financial markets ap-
proach perfect competition, defects exist even in those markets because all parties are not
equally informed, and also noting that other markets are often characterized by slow-to-change
prices that are offered by sellers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis).
7. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-40 (1988) (illustrating
supply and demand curves under monopoly conditions); LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 914.
Under antitrust law, an economic monopoly is defined as the ability to raise price above the
competitive level or to exclude competitors. See United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ("Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion.").
8. See generally JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 234 (4th ed. 1988)
(illustrating that monopoly can be regarded as a hindrance to trade, and that the resulting re-
duction in the volume of production and exchange results in an efficiency loss compared to the
results in a competitive market). Economists have, however, formulated a theory of the "Second
Best." Briefly, "[tihe General Theory of Second Best [ ] holds that correction for one market
imperfection will not necessarily be efficiency-enhancing unless we also simultaneous[ly] correct
for all other market imperfections. This is because one correction may have unintended and
unanticipated consequences that adversely impact market efficiency or transaction costs else-
where." Thomas S. Ulen, Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theory of Second Best in Law
2000] SHAP1NG COMPETITION ON THE INTERNET
A. Toward Perfect Competition? Internet Technology and Markets
The Internet employs technology that makes realization of
the conditions for perfect competition more likely. For example,
search engine software allows users to sort through the vast
amounts of information on the Internet quickly and easily, enabling
them to make more informed purchasing decisions. By decreasing
transaction costs and making information more accessible, search
engines help Internet markets to more closely approximate the zero
transaction cost and perfect information hallmarks of textbook per-
fect competition than "real" world markets.
Search engines work by periodically sending software called
a "spider" or a "robot" out to crawl the web, making copies of web
sites from which the software culls relevant information to use in
building a searchable database. 9 When a user enters a query, the
search engine scans its database, returning a list of sites likely to
match the user's interests. Search engines vary in their quality, but
the technology continues to evolve toward increasing accuracy. 10
Specialized search engines called metasites can aggregate
the search process in more or less depth." Metasites offer relatively
little original content, instead providing value by organizing the
content of others in one or more ways. Some metasites provide indi-
ces into specific types of information. For example, Total-
NEWS.com's web site consists primarily of hyperlinks to other news
organizations. 2 It functions as a one-stop portal from which a user
can travel to a number of different sites that actually perform the
service of providing the news.
Metasites, including TotalNEWS.com, often combine indices
with a search capability. For example, AuctionWatch.com, a meta-
site that provides an index into sites that conduct auctions (while
and Economics, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 220 (1998). Ulen also notes the sheer difficulty of
quantifying the second best problem and integrating it into legal analysis, contending that insti-
tutional characteristics both militate against judges considering second best effects in common
law cases and suggesting that the legislature is best suited to address them. See id.
9. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82
MINN. L. REV. 609, 623-24 (1998) (explaining how search engines operate and citing authorities).
10. While techniques for more accurately matching a user's query with sites that will actu-
ally be of interest are improving, the sheer volume of information on the web prevents search
engines from being comprehensive. See Ryan Davis, Study: Search Engines Can't Keep up with
Expanding Net, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 1999, at C1 (noting that "catch-all" search engines are
having difficulty keeping up with the proliferation of web pages); see also Search Engine Watch,
(last visited June 8, 2000), http://www.searchenginewatch.com (rating search engines and pro-
viding guidance on their use).
11. See Mike France, Copyright on the Net. Who 'Owns'a Price, BUS. WM, Dec. 13, 1999, at
EB14.
12. See TotalNEWS, (last visited June 8, 2000), http://www.totalnews.com.
1969
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not holding auctions itseli), lets a user search for items of interest. 13
A user can enter the desired item, say, "Mickey Mantle auto-
graphed baseball." AuctionWatch will search its database built by
copying information from actual auction web sites, and return a list
of those sites that offer the autographed baseball and at what
price. 14
Because it offers comparison pricing data, AuctionWatch.com
is also called a "shopbot." Generally, shopbots are software agents
that use spiders to amass product and pricing information to allow
comparison shopping.15
Other metasites combine a search capability with additional
data aggregation, functioning as "aggregators of aggregators." For
example, a user who visits metacrawler.com 16 may enter a search
request that metacrawler will then pass on to a number of popular
search engines, returning results from all of them. 17 Users would
find this service valuable because any one search engine indexes
only a fraction of web sites.18 By aggregating the search process,
metacrawler.com obviates the need for users to travel to a number
of individual search engine web sites to enter the same query and
sort through the results manually. Similarly, a shopbot aggregator
is one that amasses the information of many shopbots, allowing a
user to go to one site to obtain comparison pricing information from
a number of different shopbots. 19
More advanced intelligent agent software also decreases
search costs by allowing a user to create a personalized
13. See AuctionWatch.com, (last visited June 5, 2000)http://www.auctionwatch.com.
14. See Victoria Slind-Flor, E-Shoppers Gain, but EBay Loses, NATL L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at
B6 (explaining that auctionwatch.com "uses an automated program, a 'bot' or 'spider,' to crawl
through the millions of listings on eBay and other online auction houses, and assemble them on
its own site"); see also Greg Stohr, Ebay Faces Antitrust Probe over Curbs on Auction Search
Sites: Wants Pay for Access, NAT'L POST, Feb. 5, 2000, at D09 (explaining how software "crawl-
ers" search other websites and giving an example of how a consumer might use Auction-
Watch.com to find a low priced Pez dispenser).
15. See Daniel Fisher, The Web: Spiders and Lies, FORBES, Jan. 24, 2000, at 148, 148.
16. See Metacrawler, (last visited June 8, 2000), http://www.metacrawler.com.
17. See Customize Your MetaCrawler Search Options, (last visited June 8, 2000),
http://www.metacrawler.com/customize (allowing users to search one, some, or all of the follow-
ing search engines--About.com, AltaVista, DirectHit, Excite, FindWhat, Google, GoTo.com,
Infoseek, Kanoodle, LookSmart, Lycos, RealNames, Sprinks, Thunderstone, and WebCrawler).
18. See Davis, supra note 10 (describing a February 1999 study showing that "the overlap
between engines remains relatively low").
19. See France, supra note 11 (explaining the operation of priceman.com, a shopbot meta-
[Vol. 53:6:19651970
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experience. 20 The user will receive only that information of interest
to him or her, decreasing the cost to sort through the extraneous
data that a less discriminating search engine may return.21
The advent of all of this technology is causing a paradigmatic
shift in methods of retailing. Historically, the slow movement of
information in the mass market led producers to make decisions
before they had accurate data on consumer preferences: The con-
sumer was a price and product taker.22 By speeding the flow of in-
formation, the Internet can eliminate many inefficiencies in the
conventional supply chain.23 It also offers the possibility of "dy-
namic pricing" in which retail prices move freely to reflect the then
current state of supply and demand. 24 Additionally, "choiceboard"
software can allow consumers to become "product makers," design-
ing their desired products from a menu of options presented by the
supplier.25
Software tools can also enable buyers and sellers to aggre-
gate into groups, enhancing the bargaining power of buyers with
like needs. 26 At the same time, individual buyers can take advan-
tage of shopbot technology to select the provider offering the lowest
price.
By decreasing the costs for users to find and become in-
formed about products in which they are interested, all of the
aforementioned technology makes Internet markets more likely to
20. See Intelligent Agents Increasingly Used in E-Commerce, (last visited June 8, 2000),
http://www.bot-spot.com/news/000327ecommerce.html (collecting a number of announcements
explaining how companies are planning to deploy intelligent agents).
21. See id. (explaining how technology will allow consumers to select their favorite foods
from neighborhood restaurants); see also Wayne Kawamoto, The Good News About News Bots, at
http://www.botspot.com/dailybot/newsbot.html (last visited June 8, 2000) (explaining how news-
bot technology can "search the websites of newspapers, magazines, and e-zines to find articles
that are of specific interest to [the searcher]").
22. See Adrian J. Slywotzky, The Age of the Choiceboard, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000,
at 40, 40 (noting that traditionally, manufacturing had to begin before suppliers had reliable
information about demand); see also Chip Bayers, Capitalist Econstruction, WIRED, Mar. 2000, at
210, 212 (noting that an unpredictable supply and demand chain "can easily break down," lead-
ing producers to 'edge against fluctuations... [by using] a fixed list price").
23. See Bayers, supra note 22, at 212 ("A seamless network of consumers, vendors, and
manufacturers means increased efficiency and communications, real-time sales analysis, a di-
minished need to stockpile excess inventory, and the eradication of many hurdles in the supply
chain.").
24. See id.; see also Michael D. Smith et al., Understanding Digital Markets: Review and As-
sessment, in UNDERSTANDING THE DrGITAL ECONOMY 5 (Erik Brynjolfsson & Brian Kahin, eds.,
forthcoming), available at http://ecommerce.mit.edu/papers/ude (citing empirical studies finding
that e-tailers change prices significantly more often than their bricks and mortar counterparts).
25. See Slywotzky, supra note 22, at 41 (discussing choiceboards and arguing that they will
dominate in many industries, reshaping the nature of competition).
26. See How to Be Perfect, supra note 3.
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approach perfect competition than conventional ones. The result
should be both lower and more uniform prices. The reality, though,
is something different.
B. Price Competition on the Internet-Pricing Dispersion and the
Power of the Brand
Conflicting studies on price make it difficult to draw a defini-
tive conclusion about price levels on the Internet other than that
they are not systematically lower than in the bricks and mortar
world.27 Additionally, price dispersion on the Internet is not lower
than in conventional markets: Prices vary by as much as 50% be-
tween e-tailers, with an average difference of 33% for books and
25% for CDs.28 Several factors account for this disparity.
1. Barriers to Entry
Barriers to entry exist even on the Internet. There are "huge
marketing and technical costs [in] setting up a business."29 Further,
once a consumer begins to buy from one e-tailer, it may face signifi-
cant costs in switching to another.30 Some e-tailers customize the
shopping experience, leaving consumers reluctant to switch to an-
other site that may not offer the same features.31 Even if another
online merchant were to offer a comparable experience, consumers
may not wish to invest time in replicating the personalization al-
ready in effect on the first site. Some sites offer loyalty rewards
27. See Karen Clay et al., Retail Strategies on the Web: Price and Non-price Competition in
the Online Book Industry, 4, 9-15, (last visited June 8, 2000) http://dnet.heinz.cm-
u.edu/dcsrg/books/papers/paperl.pdf (finding, in a week-long study of 107 book titles, that online
and real world book stores charged essentially the same prices, but that real world stores were
cheaper overall because sales tax is generally lower than shipping costs). But see Smith et al.,
supra note 24, at 3-4 (reviewing empirical studies showing that prices tended to be higher online
in 1996-97 but that by 1998-99 they had dropped to a level 9-16% below that of bricks and mor-
tar stores, and suggesting that this change could be a result of the Internees becoming a more
efficient market).
28. See Clay et al., supra note 27, at 4, 26 (finding large price disparities across booksellers
ranging up to 73%); Smith et aL, supra note 24, at 6 (noting also that airline ticket prices differ
by as much as 20%).
29. Internet Economics: A Thinkers' Guide, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2000, at 64, 64 [hereinafter
Internet Economics]; see also Clay et al., supra note 27, at 7 (quoting Amazon's CEO as saying,
"[w]hile it is true that if all you want to do is put up something for sale, the barriers of entry are
extremely low on the Internet. If you actually want to sell a lot of that stuff, they are quite high
and getting higher all the time").
30. See Frictions in Cyberspace, supra note 3.
31. See id.; Clay et al., supra note 27, at 8-9 (describing various ways merchants try to avoid
price competition by differentiating themselves).
1972 [Vol. 53:6:1965
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(like the conventional airline frequent flyer programs), to repeat
purchasers.32 Also, the network effects that characterize some
products like software can keep consumers "locked into" a single
supplier that, as a result, can exercise considerable market power,
including power over price.33 Secondcomers then, may face material
barriers to entry that partly account for the observed price disper-
sion.
2. Imperfect Information
For consumers to take advantage of comparison pricing tools
like shopbots, they have to know that such tools exist, and be will-
ing to spend time using them.3 4 If either of these conditions does not
hold, the consumer will not be perfectly informed about alterna-
tives. Moreover, even if the consumer avails his- or herself of a
shopbot, he or she is still unlikely to be perfectly informed because
a particular shopbot indexes only a portion of the web. 35
3. Search costs
Non-trivial search costs also prevent perfect competition
from materializing on the Internet. Search costs are relatively
lower on the Internet than in conventional media but are not, in an
absolute sense, anywhere near zero. Search engines are less than
totally accurate, tending toward indiscriminacy. One search for on-
line bookstores returned 5,173,884 web pages that might be of in-
terest.3 6 However, search costs should continue to decline as tech-
32. See Clay et al., supra note 27, at 8-9.
33. See Internet Economics, supra note 29, at 64 ('In some industries, low marginal costs ...
and network effects ... will result in increasing returns to scale, and thus the emergence of
monopolies."); see generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) (explaining network effects). Digital distribution,
however, may require that software providers rethink their pricing strategies. See Smith et al.,
supra note 24, at 23-24 (noting the strategy of providing an "open source" and also stating that
"value-oriented pricing strategies are likely to be more effective"); see also J. Bradford DeLong &
A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative Microeconomics for Tomorrow's Economy, (Nov. 22, 1999)
http://personal.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/spec.htm (discussing the evolution of software
marketing).
34. See Clay et al., supra note 27, at 6.
35. See supra note 10; see also Clay et al., supra note 27, at 6 n.7 ("It is important to note
that search engines do differ in the amount of information provided and [sites] covered. Thus,
even consumers who use a search engine may not have perfect information").
36. See Smith et al., supra note 24, at 11 n.5 (conveying the results of a search using the Al-
taVista search engine).
20001 1973
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nology evolves and consumers become both increasingly aware of its
existence and adept at its use.
4. Homogeneous products
Perfect competition also requires homogeneous products.
Product differentiation on the Internet might account for the per-
ceived variety in price. However, studies show that while heteroge-
neity may account for some dispersion, a substantial amount is
"due to other unobserved retailer-specific factors such as brand,
trust, and awareness." 37 Indeed, shopbot executives have indicated
that their customers often buy from the brand they recognize even
when it is not the low price leader: Amazon.com and CDNow, well-
known e-tailers, "charge prices that are 7-12% higher than" those of
other, lesser known e-tailers.38
As search engine technology improves, transaction costs will
decline, potentially decreasing the power of a recognizable brand.
Some commentators predict that this power will inevitably wane as
users' trust moves to an intelligent agent personalized for their
needs.39 If trust shifts in this way, the only brands with value will
be those of the software agent and the manufacturer of the product:
The site from whom the agent makes the ultimate purchase and
any others employed by it during the purchasing process will be
transparent to the user.40
At the same time, however, e-tailers with established brands
are unlikely to be receptive to erosion of their brands' power. In
fact, a desire to maintain whatever market power the brand confers
explains, at least in part, why some sites are seeking to control the
flow of their product and pricing information.
37. Smith et al., supra note 24, at 10.
38. Id. at 12.
39. See Bayers, supra note 22, at 211.
40. See id. at 215.
"In fact, the entire notion of a retail brand is out of place [on the Internet]...
On the Web, you can collect user feedback and have an objective third party [in-
telligent agent] steer you toward the products you want to buy as an all-in-one
service . ." The only brands that survive ... will belong to manufacturers and
intermediaries .... "The value is at the edges of the network-the product on
one end and the customer interface on the other."
1974 [Vol. 53:6:1965
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II. CONTROLLING PRODUCT AND PRICING INFORMATION
Recently, the number of sites objecting to indexing by search
engines, particularly metasites, has increased. Formerly, sites wel-
comed the search engines as tools making it easier for users to find
them. As some sites have had success in establishing their brand
names in the consumer consciousness, however, their need for the
search engines has correspondingly decreased. In fact, the best-
known sites may prefer that users travel directly to them rather
than first going to a search engine from which they may choose to
go to a competitive site.
In 1997, one-third of the sites from which the early genera-
tion shopbot BargainFinder sought product and pricing information
took technological steps to block the shopbot's access. 41 Indeed,
some shopbots today search only sites with whom they have agree-
ments granting permission to index.42 Of course, the value to con-
sumers of a shopbot that searches only selected sites is lower than
that of a more comprehensive one. 43
EBay, the online auction site, has been one of the most vocif-
erous opponents of metasites. It has taken both technological and
legal steps to block auction indexing sites like AuctionWatch.com4
and Bidder's Edge from using spiders to obtain information on the
products offered at the eBay site.45 Similarly, Ticketmaster has
sued Tickets.com, trying to prevent Tickets.com from indexing in-
41. See DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 33 ('As of March 1997, one third of merchants tar-
geted by BargainFinder locked out its queries."). One merchant objected on competitive grounds
while another two indicated that they could not process the volume of "hobbyist" requests coming
from Bargain Finder. See id.
42. See Jim McLellan, Web Life: Shopping Around, GUARDIAN, Oct. 14, 1999, available at
1999 WL 25738124 (noting that two reasons account for the failure of a shopbot to search all web
sites: (i) some sites block shopbots from searching their content; and (ii) some shopbots "will
search only the online shops they have deals with"); Tricia Serju-Harris, Net Shopping Firm Sues
Priceman.com, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1999, at 2 (describing a lawsuit filed by a shopbot,
mySimon.com against a shopbot aggregator, priceman.com, and quoting the president of the
company that owns Priceman.com as saying, "[s]ome sites enter into merchant agreements and
only search the merchants they sign up with").
43. See Serju-Harris, supra note 42 (noting that Priceman.com contends that if shopbots
search only those sites with which they have agreements, "[tihat doesn't give consumers the
equal opportunity of other values on the Nef').
44. See Louise Kehoe, Networking-Online Information: Free, or Not So Free, BUS. DAY,
Feb. 10, 2000, at 20, available at 2000 WL 7451027 (describing how eBay and AuctionWatch
engaged in a technological war as eBay blocked AuctionWatch's access and AuctionWatch cir-
cumvented the block).
45. See First Amended Complaint at 28, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d
1058 (N.D. Cal 2000) (No. C-99-21200) (filed Jan. 14, 2000) (commencing legal action against
Bidder's Edge for indexing the eBay site and describing how Bidder's Edge circumvented "techni-
cal measures" eBay had put into place to keep Bidder's Edge out).
1975
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formation about what tickets are available for purchase at the
Ticketmaster web site, and from providing consumers with hyper-
links allowing them to travel to the interior pages of the Ticketmas-
ter web site.46
"[A] virtual war over access to and control of price informa-
tion is raging in the online marketplace. ' 47 In evaluating what the
legal response should be, it is first helpful to consider why these
disputes are occurring, and the non-legal steps that sites are taking
to order competition on the Internet.
A. Why Object to Indexing?
One might intuitively think that online merchants would
welcome any publication of their product and pricing information
(whatever the source) because it increases the chance that consum-
ers will visit their sites and make purchases. For a number of rea-
sons, however, e-tailers are trying to control whether and how con-
sumers obtain product and pricing information.
1. Maintaining Market Power
From a social perspective, perfect competition reflects the
most efficient marketplace ordering and provides consumers with
the greatest benefits. Firms, however, are concerned primarily with
their own profits rather than aggregate social good. Given a choice,
they would prefer to exercise some degree of market power and
avoid competing solely on price. Market power allows a producer to
capture a greater percentage of the consumer surplus than under
perfect competition.48
The empirical data on price dispersion shows that firms with
established brands are exerting some market power not attribut-
able to quality differences. Such firms have an incentive to use that
power to withhold information from consumers that, if provided to
them, would bring the relevant markets closer to perfect competi-
46. See Second Amended Complaint at 16-24, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No.
99-7654, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (filed Apr. 21, 2000) (alleging a num-
ber of causes of action, including copyright infringement, breach of contract, and unfair competi-
tion for the manner in which Tickets.com indexes Ticketmaster's event information and hyper-
links users to the Ticketmaster site).
47. DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 33.
48. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 8, at 234 (demonstrating that part of the consumer surplus
in a competitive market is transferred to the monopolist in the form of producer surplus in a
monopoly).
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tion.49 Because technology is evolving in a direction that may erode
brand power, this strategy may not be successful in the long-run. In
the short-term, however, it may allow established sites to extract
supra-competitive profits by erecting a barrier to entry and keeping
consumer search costs higher than they would otherwise be. That
this strategy may not endure is hardly a reason to allow use of the
law as a sword to stop automated indexing in the interim, unless
there is an offsetting, pro-competitive rationale justifying limits on
the availability of product and pricing information.
2. Product Differentiation and Misleading Information
Price alone may not always be an accurate signal. An e-tailer
might argue that consumers are misled when faced with only its
high price compared to competitors' lower ones. The consumer may
purchase from the provider with the lowest price because he or she
is unaware that a higher price reflects better product attributes like
warranties or services for which the consumer, if informed, would
be willing to pay.50 If unfettered price-only competition proceeds,
the market will degenerate, offering low-quality products with
shoddy service. 51 Thus, pricing information should be kept from the
consumer because he or she lacks the capability to disaggregate it
into its component parts.
This argument ignores both theory and fact. Theory would
hold that if a shopbot does not provide all of the data relevant to a
purchasing decision, consumers will not use it. Market forces
should therefore lead shopbots to improve their technology to more
accurately inform consumers. Indeed, over time, BargainFinder de-
veloped from a bare-bones system to one that provides output "that
can be sorted by price, by speed of delivery, or by merchant. It can
be further customized to take account of shipping costs by zip code,
and results can be sorted by price or by speed of delivery."52
Available data also indicate that the product differentiation
story simply may not be true, at least for highly homogeneous
products like books and CDs. Also, surprisingly, one study found
49. But see HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 8, at 234-35 (noting the Theory of Second Best which
holds that one change to a market, such as solving problems of information asymmetries, may
not enhance efficiency if all other market imperfections are not simultaneously corrected).
50. See DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 33 (calling this the " 'kindly service' story"); see also
How to Be Perfect, supra note 3 (discussing dimensions other than price on which suppliers com-
pete, including speed of delivery, reputation, and warranty, and describing technology that al-
lows competition across many factors).
51. See id.
52. Id.
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that "pricier retailers offer service terms, such as flexible returns
rules, that are no better-and sometimes worse-than cheaper
ones."
5 3
In short, the consumer is better off knowing something about
the product rather than nothing at all.54 The Supreme Court shares
this view. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court addressed the
claim that advertising by lawyers should be restricted:
[It is true that a]dvertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to
select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that
the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to
reach an informed decision .... [Tihe prohibition of advertising [ ] serves only to
restrict the information that flows to consumers. Moreover, the argument assumes
that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising,
and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but in-
complete information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the
public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that is based on the
benefits of public ignorance.65
Likewise, in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, a Sherman Act case involving a ban on competitive
bidding by an association of engineers, the Court said:
It may be, as petitioner argues, that competition tends to force prices down and
that an inexpensive item may be inferior to one that is more costly ....
[Competitive bidding for engineering projects may be inherently imprecise and in-
capable of taking into account all the variables which will be involved in the actual
performance of the project. Based on these considerations, a purchaser might con-
clude that his interest in quality ... outweighs the advantages of achieving cost
savings by pitting one competitor against another.w
As the Court implies, quality conscious consumers may simply
avoid the competitive process. But that is not a reason to withdraw
from them, or others who are less concerned about quality, the op-
portunity to participate in that process if they so choose. Product
differentiation then, is not a strong basis for granting control over
product and pricing information to a web site.
Sites may claim, however, that shopbots mislead consumers
in other ways. When a user queries a shopbot, the shopbot usually
does not search against the contents of the entire web, but rather
against its own database that is comprised of contents drawn from
53. Frictions in Cyberspace, supra note 3.
54. Certainly, if the consumer makes repeat purchases, he or she will discover relevant
product differences besides price and adjust his or her behavior accordingly. Moreover, consum-
ers will invest the time and money appropriate to the magnitude of their purchase in under-
standing how to allocate the price to product features.
55. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977).
56. National Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694 (1978) (citations omit-
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the web at a specific time.57 Shopbots update their databases, but
not in real time.58 If sites change their prices, a consumer may re-
ceive an old quotation from a shopbot, and be disappointed when he
or she tries to make a purchase only to discover that the quoted
price is not the actual one. The consumer may blame the destina-
tion site for the discrepancy rather than the shopbot, eroding the
destination site's goodwill.
While this concern has some merit,59 it may be addressed in
less restrictive ways than by legally barring shopbots from indexing
and thereby withholding information from consumers. For example,
shopbots could post a notice informing visitors that the shopbot it-
self is solely responsible for the accuracy of product and pricing in-
formation and that such data changes with time. Regardless, as
more consumers use shopbots, only the more accurate ones should
survive. The law should consider whether it should impose an af-
firmative disclosure obligation on the shopbot to warn against pos-
sible inaccuracies, but the mere fact that some errors occur does not
support a legal prohibition against its use of spiders.
3. Protecting Computer Servers from Overburdening
A potentially pro-competitive justification for a site's desire
to stop unwanted indexing is based on the burden that spiders place
on the indexed system's resources. For example, eBay would argue
that it is not seeking unprecedented control over its product and
pricing information. It seeks only to limit the manner in which a
user obtains that information.60 Ebay is willing to allow unlicensed
indexers to conduct real-time queries against its database, and for
consumers to obtain product and pricing information from eBay di-
57. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
58. See First Amended Complaint at 23, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d
1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200) C'Bidder's Edge copies the eBay category listing pages
only periodically. The auctions on eBay are ongoing and the items listed, number of bids and the
price of any item are subject to change at any time. The auction listings which appear on Bid-
der's Edge, therefore, frequently do not accurately reflect the current state of the auction on eBay
and those listings can in fact be dramatically incorrect due to staleness:'); see also Charles Piller,
Ebay Moves to Halt Indexing of Its Auctions by Outsiders, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1999, at C1 (giving
examples of inaccuracies in search results both from AuctionWatch and from eBay itself).
59. One might, of course, query how this is any different from what happens in the "real
world." Magazines and other publications often quote prices that may turn out to be inaccurate
at a particular time and place.
60. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 CIt appears that the primary dispute was over the
method [Bidder's Edge] uses to search the eBay database. eBay wanted [Bidder's Edge] to con-
duct a search of the eBay system only when the ,[Bidder's Edge] system was queried by a [Bid-
der's Edge] user:') (emphasis added).
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rectly or from "licensed" indexers. 61 It wants to stop unauthorized
indexing because the technology employed by the spiders imposes a
burden on its servers, decreasing response time to and availability
of the system for "licensed" indexers and "legitimate" users inter-
ested in making a purchase at the site. Indeed, any site overbur-
dened in this way may lose customers and eventually be forced out
of business, even though it might be the most efficient producer in
the marketplace.
If this is true, then it is a cause for concern. This suggests
that the law minimally should consider the burden that spiders
place on the systems they search and provide a remedy if that bur-
den becomes "unreasonable."62
What is an unreasonable burden? EBay argues that Bidder's
Edge's spider occupies about 1.53% of its system's capacity. 63
Standing alone, this is trivial. But if many other spiders were to
roam the site, they could collectively burden the system enough to
cause it to crash, or at least to force eBay into spending money to
increase its capacity to forestall just such a crash.64 Should the law
provide a remedy based on an anticipation of future harm if unau-
thorized spiders proliferate? Internet economics suggests not.
The optimal number of spiders indexing a site may be
greater than one, but it is likely also to be less than the number
that would cause the system to crash. Many sites still make money
by selling advertising. 65 Metasites, because they offer little or no
61. See id.; see also First Amended Complaint at 28, eBay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (noting
that eBay has licensed others to index its site and offered such a license to Bidder's Edge). It is
unclear whether the conduct which eBay would tolerate would, in fact, result in less of a burden
for its system than the conduct to which it objects-i.e., unauthorized spidering. Note also that
after the court enjoined Bidder's Edge from engaging in spidering, Bidder's Edge provided its
users with information on eBay auctions by searching the eBay site in real-time. See Steven
Bonisteel, Bidder's Edge Searches eBay Again, NEWSBYTES, June 8, 2000,
http:llwww.newsbytes.com/pubNewsl0O/150308.html.
62. Another alternative is simply to provide sites with an entitlement to block all unlicensed
spidering. See infra Part IV (discussing the normative framework that informs the selection of
an entitlement system).
63. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (stating that the 1.53% figure refers to the number of
requests received by eBay from Bidder's Edge, and noting that eBay also argues that 1.10% of
the data transferred by it during certain time frames was transmitted to Bidder's Edge).
64. Indeed, this possibility was a major motivation in the eBay coures willingness to grant a
preliminary injunction. See id. at 1066 C'If [Bidder's Edge's] activity is allowed to continue un-
checked, it would encourage other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of
the eBay system such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system perform-
ance, system unavailability, or data losses.").
65. See Internet Advertising Revenues Soar to $4.6 Billion in 1999, (last visited May 31,
2000), http://www.iab.net/news/content/revenues.html [hereinafter Internet Advertising Reve-
nues].
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content of their own, rely particularly heavily on this model. Adver-
tising rates are going down, in part because of the large supply of
web sites.66 Chances are high that the number of indexing sites that
could attract enough money to remain in business is less than the
number that would materially adversely affect system performance.
The law should therefore tread carefully in assessing claims
that unauthorized spidering overburdens the indexed site's servers.
Such claims may have merit 67 or may be asserted as a pretext to
mask an anti-competitive intent. Further, even if unauthorized
spidering results in an intolerable burden from a legal perspective,
the law should consider the benefit the public derives from easy
availability of product and pricing information from even unau-
thorized sources. The appropriate remedy to best protect consumer
welfare may not always be to enjoin the spider. Instead, more crea-
tive redress like allowing the spider to continue its conduct but re-
quiring it to pay the indexed site to expand that site's capacity may
make sense.
4. Protecting Revenue Models
Another potentially pro-competitive justification for stopping
unauthorized indexing is to protect the indexed site's revenue mod-
els. Web sites make money in a variety of ways in addition to the
sale of products. 68 Besides selling advertising space, 69 many sites
now also make money through commissions: They receive a fee from
a site when they refer customers to it.70 Some have also entered into
66. See 10th Interactive Newspapers Conference Isn't Rosy, but Thorns Are Less Sharp,
NEWSINC., Mar. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 13223580 (attributing declining rates to "huge
supply"); see also Thomas Hirschmann, Punters Fancy Yahoo! Prospects, NAT'L POST, Sept 10,
1999, at D02 ("Ad rates have been in a prolonged slump, with more companies chasing the avail-
able advertising dollars."), Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, How To Acquire Customers
on the Web, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 2000, at 179, 186 (noting that rates for banner ads de-
clined from $70 CPM in 1994 to around $30 today).
67. See supra note 41 (explaining that small sites objected to Bargain Finder's indexing be-
cause they could not process the volume of queries).
68. For an early discussion of web revenue models, see O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 625-30.
The revenue models discussed there-advertising, subscriptions, cybershopping (or e-commerce),
and commission arrangements--continue to be viable. The relative mix among the models as
well as the technology implementing a particular model changes over time.
69. The advertising model is based on that pioneered by the television industry. See Jeffrey
L. Sampler, Ask the Tough Question Before Entering a Portal, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS,
July 8, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17355522 CThe current justification for [advertising] revenue
is analogous to the television advertising model-the more eyeballs, the higher the advertising
rate.").
70. See Nicholas G. Carr, Hypermediation" Commerce as Clickstream, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 46, 46-47 (giving an example of how a user could pass through nine interme-
diaries on his or her way to a destination, with money changing hands with each click, and not-
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linking agreements of various types. A popular destination site may
be able to convince others to pay it for the privilege of hyperlinking
to it or indexing its contents. 71 By providing a separate source of
information unsanctioned by the destination site, "unlicensed" me-
tasites undercut these revenue models in one way or another.
For example, advertising rates depend in some way on the
number of users who see the ad.7 2 If the user's entry into the web is
through a metasite, the chances that the user will travel to the site
on which the ad appears may decrease, thereby lowering the desti-
nation site's advertising revenue. Additionally, empirical data
shows that advertisers are increasingly using their money to place
ads on specialized sites tailored to the interests of their target mar-
kets. 73
That traffic may be diverted before it reaches a particular
site is not, however, a new problem. Unless the user types a site's
URL directly into his or her web browser, he or she will pass
through one or more sites on the way to the destination. When a
metasite indexes product and pricing information to present com-
parison data to consumers, a particular consumer's failure to click-
through to the destination site results from its informed decision
not to purchase there. That this decision will mean less advertising
revenue for the destination site selling the product hardly seems a
compelling reason to prohibit indexing.
A commission arrangement is a revenue model for the refer-
ring rather than the destination site. In fact, under this model,
"unlicensed" metasites could actually effectively increase the desti-
nation site's profit. When a user travels to the site through an unaf-
filiated metasite, the destination owes no commission. However, to
protect their revenue streams, affiliate sites would prefer that users
ing that the volume of clicks and efficiency in processing transactions make "microtransactions"
feasible).
71. EBay has entered into license agreements with some aggregators. See First Amended
Complaint at 1 28, eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No.
C-99 21200).
72. The parties may set the advertising rate in any of a number of ways, basing it on the
number of users who see the ad, the number who click-through, or the number who click-through
and make a purchase from the sponsoring site. The latter metric most accurately measures the
effectiveness of the ad in inducing purchase. According to the Internet Advertising Bureau,
"hybrid deals accounted for 52% of revenue transactions for Q4 [1999], 53% for the year [1999]
with CPMs or impression-based deals at 40% for both Q4 and the year and performance-based
deals at 8% of Q4 revenues, 7% for the full year." Internet Advertising Revenues, supra note 65.
73. See Secondary Portals Getting More Focused, IR. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at 59 (citing fore-
casts that 57% of advertising revenue will move to more targeted sites but noting that large
portal sites like AOL, Yahoo!, and MSN can withstand some erosion in their profits).
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travel through them rather than other, unaffiliated metasites. The
destinations might therefore oppose unaffiliated sites simply to
keep their current network happy.74
Some sites currently make money by charging other sites for
the privilege of linking and/or indexing. Metasites that engage in
such conduct for free clearly undercut the revenue stream the des-
tination site enjoys.
Existing legal authority suggests that the mere act of in-
cluding a hyperlink on a site does not implicate any legally cogniza-
ble right of the linked site.75 That some sites pay for the "privilege"
of linking to another may reflect conservative legal advice in an en-
vironment of some uncertainty and/or that the linking agreement
provides it with benefits other than simply the right to link.76 If,
however, there is no legal right to stop a site from including a hy-
perlink, then the "unlicensed" link of the metasite, while it does
undercut revenue derived from linking agreements, does not in it-
self produce a harm meriting legal redress.
The instant issue is whether there is a legal right to stop un-
authorized indexing. If there were, sites could protect the revenue
they derive from licensing the right to index. But to argue that be-
cause sites make money in this way, they must have an entitlement
to stop "unlicensed" indexers bootstraps the result without any con-
sideration of the normative implications of granting such a right.
The point here is that the law should critically examine claims that
unauthorized indexing constitutes impermissible free-riding on the
indexed site's information simply because it undercuts a site's
source of revenue. Generally, the law is primarily concerned with
free-riding when it threatens the incentive to create and market the
original product (as in the case of piracy or close similarity) than
when it does not (as when the free-rider adds substantial value).
74. Interestingly, the commission model provides an incentive for metasites to seek an
agreement with another site before indexing it. If the metasite attracts a sufficient volume of
traffic, it might find the destination site willing to pay it for indexing it. As the commission
model gains acceptance and other technological trends erode the brand power of established
sites, "unlicensed" metasites may decline. On the other hand, metasites may lose the value of
their independence if they affiliate with sites they index.
75. "[H]yperlinking does not itself involve a violation of the Copyright Act . since no
copying is involved." Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc. CTicketmaster r'), 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1344, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (order on defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint). However, this order was superseded by a minute order issued August 10, 2000 that
did not discuss the validity of hyperlinking. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc. ('Tick-
etmaster II'), No. CV 99-7654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
76. See O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 643-44 (discussing how businesses use linking agree-
ments "to establish complementary business and marketing relationships, provide for reciprocal
links, establish performance requirements, and clarify liability issues").
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Ultimately, of course, courts cannot divorce the resolution of the
relevance of such diversion from the normative question of how en-
titlements should be defined on the web-a question to which this
Article later returns. 77
The preceding evaluation of sites' motivations for blocking
spiders does suggest that courts should take a skeptical view of
claims that such control is necessary to protect consumers. How-
ever, courts should consider the real nature of the burden "unli-
censed" spidering places on the system as well as the impact the
spider has on the site's revenue stream. They should balance these
private costs against the public benefit accruing from easy avail-
ability of comparison product and pricing information. The more
threatening the spidering is to the very existence of the web site,
the more likely it should be policed in some way.
B. How to Prevent Indexing Technologically
Sites seeking to block indexers do not have to rely on the law
to enjoin a metasite. They can take technological measures to block
the access of those whom they wish to exclude. These technological
measures can be more or less complex. For example, a site may in-
clude a robot exclusion header in its robots.txt file.78 This header
signals a site's unwillingness to be searched by spiders. A spider
encountering it should, therefore, desist from indexing the site. For
this technique to be successful, the spider must voluntarily choose
to respect the header. 79
Other technological measures are less dependent on the spi-
der's -goodwill. A site is usually able to detect a spider's presence if
an unusually large number of requests for information are coming
from one server. Every server has a unique "Internet Protocol"
("IP") address. The site can investigate the particular IP address
associated with a large number of queries, then implement techno-
logical steps to block requests originating there from being proc-
77. See infra Part IV (discussing the normative framework that informs the selection of an
entitlement system).
78. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (de-
fining a robot exclusion header as "a message, sent to computers programmed to detect and re-
spond to such headers, that [the site] does not permit unauthorized robotic activity").
79. See id.; see also id. at 1062 (quoting an e-mail stating that "well-behaved robots are still
expected to check the robots.txt file" and respect any exclusion).
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essed.80 However, by routing requests through another's sever
(called a "proxy server"), the indexing site can evade an IP block.8 1
A site could use password or encryption technology more ef-
fectively to protect its content from unwanted visitors. However, in
their current form, these devices can't discriminate between spiders
and other, "legitimate" users. Moreover, while they may slow the
spider down, they may also make access difficult enough for "le-
gitimate" users that these visitors will instead travel to an easier to
access open site.
The risk with any technological measure is that the blocked
site will simply break through the technological barrier, causing the
original site to build a higher wall, and so on, until the parties
reach some equilibrium point in this technological arms race. A site
blocking access would likely argue that this arms race is not the
best use of resources. Rather, it may assert that even if a spider
may enter a publicly available web site, once that site takes some
technological step to prevent access, the spider cannot legitimately
circumvent that protective measure. By bifurcating the questions of
access and use, the blocking site has a better chance of effectively
stopping use even of uncopyrightable data: Impermissible access
contaminates any use, even those the copyright law would allow.
If the law upholds such access constraints, it may inadver-
tently hamper competition and create exclusive rights akin to in-
tellectual property rights regardless of the status of the "locked"
information under the intellectual property laws. A brief analysis of
the causes of action that sites are asserting reinforces the conten-
tion that the crucial policy issue for the immediate future is less
80. See id. at 1061 (describing how eBay investigates robotic activity and blocks it by ig-
noring requests from the originating IP address).
81. See id.
Organizations often install "proxy server" software on their computers. Proxy
server software acts as a focal point for outgoing Internet requests ... Typi-
cally, organizations limit the use of their proxy servers to local users. However,
some organizations, either as a public service or because of a failure to properly
protect their proxy server through the use of a "firewall," allow their proxy
servers to be accessed by remote users. Outgoing requests from remote users
can be routed through such unprotected proxy servers and appear to originate
from the proxy server. Incoming responses are then received by the proxy
server and routed to the remote user. Information requests sent through such
proxy servers cannot easily be traced back to the origination IP address and can
be used to circumvent attempts to block queries from the originating IP ad-
dress. Blocking queries from innocent third party proxy servers is both ineffi-
cient, because it creates an endless game of hide-and-seek, and potentially
counterproductive, as it runs a substantial risk of blocking requests from le-
gitimate, desirable users who use that proxy server.
Id. (citations omitted).
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what constitutes permissible use of information than what consti-
tutes allowable access.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ACCESS AND USE OF PRODUCT
AND PRICING INFORMATION
There are a variety of both federal and state claims that
sites could tenably assert to protect their product and pricing in-
formation. This Article focuses on those that go to the claim that
indexing such information obtained from a publicly available web
site without permission is an unauthorized access and/or use of that
information.
A. Federal Claims
1. Copyright Infringement
At first glance, the claim that the copying of product and
pricing information is copyright infringement is untenable.8 2 Such
information is an uncopyrightable fact.83 Reproduction of it there-
fore cannot constitute copyright infringement.
However, the manner in which search engines work likely
implicates copyright rights. Most web sites contain at least some
copyrightable data. Search engines make "wholesale" copies of web
site content, including the copyrightable, then extract the data they
want in creating their own databases. This intermediate copying
may constitute infringement of the exclusive right to reproduce.
But a court may excuse an infringement as fair.8 4 In evalu-
ating a claim of fair use, a court balances a number of factors,8 5 in-
82. See Delong & Froomkin, supra note 33 C(The claim that E-bay's auction prices or the de-
tails of the sellers' offers to sell are protected in the U.S. by copyright, trade secret, or other in-
tellectual property law is bogus."). Note also that eBay doesn't even own all of the information it
presents: Much of it is provided by the parties who offer items for bid. See David Lazarus, Auc-
tionWatch Rams Through EBay's Information Blockade, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2000, at D1
(quoting an AuctionWatch spokesman as stating that eBay's content is "not even generated by
eBay... [but] generated by their user baseL]" and noting eBay's response "conceding that de-
scriptions and photos submitted by users are indeed the property of the submitters," but arguing
that "additional information, such as number of bids received and length of bidding, is produced
by eBay and remains eBay's property").
83. But see CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding prices in a
guide to collectible coins copyrightable because the publisher used a creative, original process to
arrive at the valuations).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
85. Under the Copyright Act, courts may weigh "(1) the purpose and character of the
use...; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
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cluding market harm to the copyright owner and the public benefit.
Under the video game cases of Sega Enterprises. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc.,8 6 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,8 7 and Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,8 8 when an in-
fringer copies copyrightable material as a step in extracting the un-
copyrightable, its copying may be excused as fair. A fair use finding
is particularly likely if the infringer's end use is "transformative" in
some way, and courts remain free to consider the public benefit.89
For example, in both Sega and Atari, the copying was a step
in the defendants' marketing of independently created video games
that ran on the plaintiffs' game consoles. 90 In Sony, the copying re-
sulted in the creation of software allowing video game owners to
play their games on a PC in addition to Sony's Playstation.91 Al-
though this copying could undercut Sony's Playstation sales, the
court found it to be transformative because it allowed users to play
games on a new platform. 92
Courts have just begun to consider fair use claims relating to
the use of copyrighted information on the Internet. In Kelly v. Ar-
riba Soft Corp., the district court held that a search engine that re-
turned images copied from the indexed web sites in response to a
user's search query made a fair use of the copyrighted images. 93 The
court emphasized that the defendant's use was quite different from
the plaintiffs because its purpose was functional rather than aes-
thetic, and was designed to make access to Internet information
easier.94
In contrast, the same district court refused to make a finding
of fair use in allowing a different case to proceed. The Los Angeles
Times and The Washington Post sued Free Republic for operating a
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted work" Id.
86. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992).
87. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc, 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
88. Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir.
2000).
89. See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 ('[W]e are free to consider the public benefit resulting
from a particular use notwithstanding the fact that the alleged infringer may gain commer-
cially.").
90. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 842; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527.
91. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 607.
92. See id.
93. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
94. See id. at 1119. But see Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that while a difference in purpose may seem to support fair use, the legal inquiry
focuses on the question of transformation). A "difference in purpose is not quite the same thing
as transformation, and [the Supreme Court] instructs that transformativeness is the critical
inquiry under this [first fair use] factor." Id.
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bulletin board site at which members posted news stories from the
papers along with their comments and criticisms for the purpose of
inducing discussion.95 Free Republic argued that it had a fair use
right to post the news to encourage debate and criticism, and also
disputed that it undercut the newspapers' revenues. 96 The judge
indicated that the combined commercial nature of Free Republic's
enterprise, its effect on the newspapers' revenues, and its copying of
the stories in their entirety made its fair use claim unlikely to suc-
ceed.97 In particular, the court found "little transformative about
copying the entirety or portions of a work verbatim[,]" despite the
addition of comments, criticism, and discussion.98
A spider's copying is also non-transformative as its value in-
heres not in adding content but in accurately reproducing product
and pricing information. However, as in Arriba Soft, the spider
adds value by making the Internet easier to navigate. Moreover, the
spider's copying of web site contents as a step in extracting product
and pricing information is more like that involved in the video
game cases than in either Arriba Soft or Free Republic: The infor-
mation used in the spider's eventual offering to consumers is only
the uncopyrightable. The search engine never displays the copy-
righted information to the public. Instead, it links to the copyright
owner's site. This situation is distinct from that of Free Republic
where the infringing site offered verbatim copies of copyrighted in-
formation. It more closely resembles the video game cases involving
intermediate copying. That the uncopyrightable information is not
"transformed" before its end use should not bar a finding of fair use
particularly since the infringer's end use significantly benefits the
public by decreasing consumers' search costs. Courts are therefore
likely to excuse this copying as fair unless it so burdens the system
as significantly to impair the value of the overall copyrighted work.
Indeed, in a minute order denying a preliminary injunction, the
Ticketmaster court indicated that, by analogy to Sony, fair use
would likely shelter Tickets.com's copying of the Ticketmaster site
to extract uncopyrightable, factual information.99
95. See Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1453, 1454 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (granting plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying defendants' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment).
96. See id. at 1461.
97. See id. at 1466-72.
98. Id. at 1460.
99. See Ticketmaster, Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc. ("Ticketmaster II"), No. CV 99-7654, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *4, *11-13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (noting that the court did not
intend its order to be a published opinion, but nevertheless reporting the courts statement that
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2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
The DMCA makes it illegal to "circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected" by
copyright. 100 As noted above, most sites will contain some copy-
righted material. If the technical solution a site adopts to keep an
indexer out is considered "a technological measure that effectively
controls access," then the indexer's bypassing of that measure could
violate the DMCA.1° 1
A technological measure is an access control if it "requires
the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work."'1 2 The
meaning of this definition is far from clear but it seems primarily
geared toward hacking10 3 around technological protection devices
that require some sort of "key" to open them that is within the con-
trol of the copyright owner. 10 4 Neither a robot exclusion nor block-
ing an IP address seems to be an access control: Gaining access to
the work by "going around" either does not require information
from the copyright owner or replicating a key provided by the copy-
because the information Tickets.com copied from Ticketmaster is not used in competition with
Ticketmaster and is destroyed after the factual, unprotected information is extracted, a fair use
defense is likely to succeed).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
101. Id. While the prohibition against the distribution of devices enabling circumvention
took effect with the Aces passage, the ban on the act of circumvention will not be effective until
October 2000, two years after the Acts enactment. See id.
102. Id. §1201(a)(3)(B). Note that the definition of"circumvent[ing] a technological measure"
includes conduct like bypassing or avoiding it. See id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). Ignoring a robot exclusion
or avoiding an IP block does not violate the Act, however, because neither implicates an access
control measure.
103. Unfortunately, the term hacking is not susceptible of a precise definition. To program-
mers, a hacker is a "clever programmer." See whatis?com, at http://www.whatis.com (last visited
June 9, 2000) (definition found by searching the IT-specific encyclopedia under the term
"hacker"). A "cracker" is one who attempts to break into a computer system. See whatis?cont, at
http://www.whatis.com (last visited June 9, 2000) (definition found by searching the IT-specific
encyclopedia under the term "cracker" or using link under the term "hacker"). However, in com-
mon parlance, a hacker is one who tries to break into a computer system. See whatis?com, at
http://www.whatis.com. This Article uses the term "hacker" in this latter sense.
104. See, e.g., CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Elecs., Inc., No. 99 C 7249, 2000 WL 715601,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2000) (holding the plaintiff authorized to maintain an action under the
DMCA where defendants provided unauthorized converter-decoders to unscramble cable sig-
nals); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes ("Universal City Studios r'), 82 F. Supp. 2d 211,
214, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that hacking of the Content Scramble System, "an encryp-
tion-based security and authentication system that requires the use of appropriately configured
hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back,
but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs," violated the DMCA); Real Networks, Inc. v. Streambox,
Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2000) (holding that circum-
venting a system that supplies information for an authentication sequence likely violates the
DMCA).
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right owner. Thus, ignoring the exclusion or using a proxy server is
unlikely to violate the DMCA.
If, however, "going around" these devices was a violation of
the access provisions, or if the spider were more obviously to fall
within the statute by breaking into a password-protected or en-
crypted system, the indexing web site would likely violate the Act.
The DMCA ostensibly does not excuse an unauthorized access even
when the eventual use of the information is fair. 105 The legislative
debates characterized unauthorized access as "the electronic
equivalent to breaking into a locked room to obtain a copy of a
book." 10 6 That one might make a fair use of the book's content does
not excuse the unauthorized access.
Essentially, through its definitions, the DMCA has protected
a web site from unauthorized access when the site owner has taken
relatively costly steps (both in implementing the technology and in
risking the loss of customers), to exclude the unwanted. 107 By
adopting a "fence" of a certain height then, a web site signals that
unwanted access imposes costs on it that justify the DMCA's re-
specting that fence. The public benefit is not obviously considered,
but one might argue that the DMCA implicitly assumes that it is
not so great as to warrant permitting circumvention of the access
controls. An information provider might not post a web site at all if
it cannot erect a legally enforceable barrier to entry.
As technology becomes increasingly sophisticated and it be-
comes easier for a site to block access selectively using a technologi-
cal measure as defined by the Act, the DMCA may warrant a second
look. As access control technologies become easier to implement, the
DMCA's original balance may be upset in a way that unintention-
ally and unduly impedes competition. However, as written, it
105. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes ("Universal City Studios Ir), 55 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1873 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), available at No. 00 Civ. 0277, 2000 WL 1160678, at *17-18 (stating that
the DMCA's legislative history indicates that fair use is not a defense to a claim under the anti-
circumvention provisions); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Wh tlie Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 539-
46(1999) (explaining how the DMCA's statement that it does not affect fair use rights, as stated
in 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (1994), squares with its provisions forbidding circumvention of access
protection devices).
106. See Samuelson, supra note 105, at 539 n.111 (quoting the House Manager's Report).
107. Of course, while these steps may be costly today, they may not be so tomorrow. Note
also that the approach of requiring that an entity take steps to block access as a condition of its
right to exclude is used in trade secret law. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, information
cannot be a trade secret and protected against misappropriation unless it "is the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
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should not prevent unauthorized spidering achieved through ig-
noring a robot exclusion or using a proxy server.
3. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")-A DMCA for
Uncopyrightable Data?
The CFAA's legislative history reveals that it was intended
to address hacking to access private, confidential information.108
The statute's language, however, is much broader: 109 "Whoever...
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains . .. information from any
protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign
communication" can be held criminally and civilly liable under the
CFAA. 110 " 'Exceed[ing] authorized access' means to access a com-
puter with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to
obtain or alter.""' To prevail in a civil action, the aggrieved party
must suffer "damage," defined as "any impairment to the integrity
or availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that [ ]
(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any 1-
year period to one or more individuals."112
A spider's access is "intentional." Even if the indexed site has
not taken steps to block a spider's entry, it may argue that the spi-
der "exceeds authorized access" because the site is intended to at-
tract traffic interested in purchasing goods and services, not in in-
dexing the site's contents. Thus, the spider uses its authorized ac-
cess to the publicly available site to gather information it is not en-
titled to obtain. This argument is not particularly persuasive. The
108. See S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7 (1996) (stating, in the context of explaining what "infor-
mation" is, that "the premise of this subsection is privacy protection"); see also id. (referring to
"hacker" intrusions).
109. See Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 936-37 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
The Shaw Court upheld a claim under the CFAA based on the sale of defective disk controllers
by defining "transmission" as not requiring computer to computer communication but rather as
extending to selling controllers with faulty microcode. See id. The court rejected Toshiba's argu-
ment that Congress intended the CFAA to apply to hackers, not to manufacturers of devices. See
id. ("[T]his court does not see a blanket exemption for manufacturers in [the statute]; nor does it
see the term 'hacking' anywhere in this statute.").
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996). "Mhe term 'protected computer' means a
computer.., which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication." Id. § (e)(2)(B).
111. Id. § 1030(e)(6).
112. Id. § 1030(e)(8) (also defining damage to include actual or potential modification or im-
pairment to medical care, physical injury, and threats to public health or safety).
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spider's entrance is authorized and its use of the information would
not violate the Copyright Act.113 Therefore it would be difficult for
the site to contend that the spider is not entitled to obtain the in-
formation it does. The CFAA claim would likely only succeed if the
law were to accord some users (i.e. those unwanted by the site), of a
publicly available web site less than all of the rights they would
have under copyright law. This seems unlikely because there is
simply no wording in or legislative intent behind the CFAA that
allows it to discriminate between users in this way.
An indexed site might alternatively argue that a spider (par-
ticularly after the site objects to its presence or erects a barrier to
entry), does not have authorized access to the site. It then violates
the CFAA merely by accessing the site to obtain information. In the
absence of some other law giving the spider an entitlement to enter,
this claim is quite tenable, particularly because there is no provi-
sion in the CFAA that permits considering the public benefit that
may accrue from allowing even certain "unauthorized" accesses.
Whether a spider violates the CFAA then, largely depends on how
the law defines property rights in a web site and therefore what
constitutes "unauthorized access."1 14 Arguably, regardless of how
the law defines those rights, liability should not accrue under the
CFAA, because the statute was not intended to deal with develop-
ing issues in e-commerce. Indeed, the risk of CFAA liability may
chill the development of new tools to conduct e-commerce.
Even if the indexed site could establish a violation of the
CFAA, it would still have to prove damages. The site would likely
argue that by burdening the system, the spider's use impairs the
system's availability to "legitimate" users. This argument, along
with the question of whether the site suffers the $5,000 in damage
required to sustain a civil action, presents factual questions on
which the site may or may not be able to sustain its burden.
Some sites derive revenue from indexing agreements under
which they charge spiders for indexing their sites. A site might
prove damage by alleging that "unlicensed" spiders deprive it of the
revenue it has a right to expect. But this is not the type of damage
that the CFAA envisions. Moreover, arguing that this damage justi-
fies a remedy simply begs the question: The site has no entitlement
to charge for indexing unless the law gives it one.
113. See supra Part III.A.1.
114. See infra Part IV.
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B. State Claims
That the critical issue determining liability for indexing is
how to define entitlements in web sites becomes even clearer when
one considers the state claims that an indexed web site is likely to
raise. While federal intellectual property law has historically pro-
vided the primary set of rules geared toward optimizing innovation,
state common law also affects innovation incentives, particularly in
times of rapid technological development. Because the speed of
technological change far outpaces the congressional ability to ad-
dress the propriety of amendments to the federal scheme, flexible
state common law may be quite influential in shaping the direction
of new technology. Such law may set the rules regarding both ac-
cess to web sites and use (particularly of uncopyrightable data),
unless and until Congress decides to act.
1. Trespass to Chattels
The ancient cause of action of trespass to land holds a person
liable for "[a]ny intentional use of another's real property, without
authorization and without a privilege by law to do so . . . without
regard to harm .... Any physical entry upon the surface of the land
is a trespass . . .115 This broad cause of action is justified, at least
in part, as required to maintain the exclusive right of possession
and use of one's real property. 116
Indeed, in the physical world, a shopkeeper can bar a cus-
tomer from entry for any reason, 117 including because the customer
would like to inventory the store's prices for comparison shopping
115. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 70 (5th ed. 1984).
116. See id.
The right to the exclusive use of property necessarily implies the correlative
right to demand that others who wish to use the property should pay for that
use . . . Various policy reasons have been given to justify the position that un-
privileged and unauthorized intentional entries should be actionable without
damage, including the prevention of the acquisition of a prescription right, to
settle a dispute regarding title, to vindicate a property right, and to avoid
breaches of the peace.
Id.
117. Public accommodation laws may limit a store's ability to exclude customers based on,
for example, race or gender. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommoda-
tions and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1289-90 (1996); see also James L. Fennessy,
Comment, New Jersey Law and Police Response to the Exclusion of Minority Patrons from Retail
Stores Based on the Mere Suspicion of Shoplifting, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 549, 552-53 (1999)
(noting that New Jersey may be the only state to hold that "businesses which are open to the
general public cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably abridge any individual's common law right to
access the property").
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purposes. 118 By analogy, an indexed site might argue that it has an
absolute right to exclude whomever it wants from its "store" and to
revoke its invitation to enter should a patron engage in activity to
which the storeowner objects.
At least some logic supports the notion that if the law re-
spects physical boundaries, it should also respect virtual ones.
However, the policy that supports protecting against physical in-
trusions is based, at least in part, on preventing breaches of the
peace. One often has some financial and psychic attachment to
one's land, particularly if the land is used for personal rather than
business purposes. The landowner may view a physical intrusion as
threatening, and be tempted to respond with force. That the in-
truder will be liable for trespass both deters his or her conduct, and
makes it less necessary for the landowner to resort to violence. The
virtual intrusion of the spider is not directly analogous to the
physical invasion against which trespass to real property protects.
It lacks the immediacy and opportunity for physical confrontation
that provides a policy basis for the trespass cause of action.
Litigants may recognize the strained nature of this
analogy.119 They have, of late, been relying on a trespass to chattels
theory of liability to regulate unwanted use of system resources,
particularly that arising from unsolicited bulk e-mail ("spam"). 120 A
trespass to chattels occurs whenever one intentionally "dispos-
sess[es] another of [a] chattel, or [ ] us[es] or intermeddle[s] with a
chattel in the possession of another."'121 Dispossession occurs when
another intentionally takes possession of the chattel or assumes
118. See Mosher v. Cook United, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 720, 720-22 (Ohio 1980) (holding that a
store had the right to revoke a comparison shopper's license to enter the store's land even though
the shopper did not engage in disorderly conduct).
119. Ticketmaster, however, does appear to be suing Tickets.com on a theory akin to virtual
trespass. See Second Amended Complaint at 21-22, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc.
C'Ticketmaster II"), No. 99-07654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (alleg-
ing that Tickets.com committed trespass against not only Ticketmaster's computer systems but
also against the "Ticketmaster Web Site"). Note also that one amicus brief filed on behalf of eBay
in its suit against Bidder's Edge argues that the analogy to real property is persuasive rather
than strained, justifying the importation of real property principles to order relationships on the
Internet. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Reed Elsevier, Inc., The National Association of Realtors
and The e-commerce Coalition, Supporting Affirmance of the Order and Opinion of the District
Court at 6-12, eBay Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal 2000) (No. C-99
21200) (filed July 12, 2000).
120. For a summary of the spain cases, see Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 28-32 (2000).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 217 (1965).
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"complete control and dominion" over it.122 "Intermeddling" means
intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the chattel. 123
For liability for intermeddling to accrue, the interference must be
"harmful to the possessor's materially valuable interest in the
physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or [ ] the posses-
sor [must be] deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial
time.. .- 124 Trespass to chattels provides the aggrieved party with a
cause of action for an interference not substantial enough to consti-
tute conversion. 125
Unlike trespass to land, trespass to chattels requires that
there be some actual damage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
the trespass. 126 Generally, that the "dignitary interest in the invio-
lability of chattels" is somewhat less than that associated with ex-
clusive rights in land, accounts for the more stringent requirement
of harm that characterizes the trespass to chattels action. 27 How-
ever, "that one person is committing a trespass to another's chattel,
while it may not be actionable because it does no harm to the chat-
tel or to any other legally protected interest of the possessor, af-
fords the possessor a privilege to use force to defend his interest in
exclusive possession."'' 28
In the spain cases, courts have held the electronic signals of
unwanted e-mail to be sufficiently tangible to interfere with the
Internet Service Provider's ("ISP's") system that receives those sig-
nals. 129 Although these signals fail to dispossess the ISP of its sys-
tem or to harm that system physically, the courts have found a le-
gally cognizable harm in the impairment of the system's value: It is
not available to process "legitimate" messages of system subscribers
122. Id. § 221 cmt. c. Dispossession also occurs when one intentionally obtains possession of
the chattel by fraud or duress, bars the rightful possessor's access to it, destroys it while in an-
other's possession, or takes it into the law's custody. See id. § 221(d)-(g).
123. See id. § 217 cmt. e.
124. Id. § 218 cmt. e.
125. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 115, at 85.
126. See id. at 87. Under the Restatement, liability accrues if (i) the trespasser takes pos-
session of or deprives the rightful possessor of use of the chattel for a substantial time; or (ii) the
chattel itself is impaired in value; or (iii) the rightful possessor suffers bodily harm; or (iv) an-
other "person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest' suffers harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218.
127. KEETON ETAL., supra note 115, at 87.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. a; see also id. § 218 cmt. e (restating the
privilege to use force and also noting the disparity in treatment between possessors of land and
chattels). 'rhe interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest of
a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless
intermeddlings with the chattel." Id.
129. See Burk, supra note 120, at 30.
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if it is processing spam. 130 Additionally, courts may find harm in the
increased costs of consumers. Consumers incur additional costs in
dealing with the unwanted mail, including the payment of higher
fees to those ISPs that charge incrementally for e-mail access.131
ISPs themselves may suffer lost revenue attributable to subscribers
who cancel their accounts because of the unwanted e-mail. 132 Some
ISPs also expend funds to install filtering software that the spam-
mers then defeat through technological means of their own.133
The analogy to unwanted indexing is easy to see. 134 The
communication between the spider and the indexed site is un-
wanted (at least once the site informs the spider of its objections),
and involves tangible electronic signals that interfere with the sys-
tem's availability to process requests originating with visitors that
the site wants to encourage. Damage could take the form of the
costs to build technological blocks to keep the spider out, to add
more capacity, and/or to repair any lost goodwill because the system
is slower than it otherwise would be, or because the information
provided by the spider to the consumer is inaccurate. The spider
would thus be liable for trespass to chattels. There is simply no
room under the conventional trespass cause of action for a court to
consider any public benefit to allowing the spider's conduct. Moreo-
ver, even if there were no damage, because the trespass has oc-
curred, the rightful possessor has a privilege to use force to defend
his or her possession. Although "force" seems intended to mean
physical contact, in this context, it could take the form of a robot
exclusion header or other technological measure designed to control
access.
Professor Dan Burk has written a devastating criticism of
the propriety of applying trespass to chattels to regulate access to
and use of the Internet.135 As he points out, the initial premise
holding electronic signals to be tangible enough to support a tres-
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1019 (explaining how CompuServe installed programs to screen out spain but
the spammers circumvented these blocks by falsifying the header information in their e-mails to
disguise their true origin).
134. See Burk, supra note 120, at 46-47 (discussing the dispute between eBay and Auction-
Watch, the auction aggregator, and how the elements of a trespass to chattels claim would be
met).
135. See id. at 32-37 (criticizing, inter alia, courts' willingness to extrapolate from trespass
to land cases in holding electronic signals to be tangible and to hunt for damage to sustain the
claim, regardless of how remote that damage is from any physical harm to the chattel).
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pass to chattels claim is faulty.136 Cases holding such items as
smoke or dust to be tangible did so in the context of trespass to
land, a cause of action based on a stronger interest in inviolability
than that of trespass to chattels. 137
At the same time, an actionable trespass has traditionally
been defined as, "[a]n unprivileged use or other intermeddling with
a chattel which results in actual impairment of its physical condi-
tion, quality or value to the possessor."'38 It is difficult to see how
the physical condition, quality, or value of the system's servers are
impaired by their receiving and processing exactly those signals for
which they were designed.139
Moreover, under the Restatement test, the trespasser is li-
able for "the loss thus caused" by the impairment of the chattel. 140
Thus, there is some causal connection between impairment and
damages. In the spam cases, the courts have hunted for damage
that does not clearly evidence this causal relationship. For example,
employee time spent to block unwanted messages has constituted
damage in at least one spain case. 141 But this time does not relate to
the already tenuous impairment of the chattel.
As Burk points out, by loosening the strict requirements for
trespass to chattels, the law, perhaps inadvertently, may confer an
extremely broad entitlement on web site owners to exclude any
communication they deem unwanted. This right applies regardless
of the actual harm (or lack thereof) to the system, the public benefit
accruing from the prohibited activity, and the lack of any public
debate over the propriety of this new entitlement. 142
2. Misappropriation
In contrast, a state claim grounded in a misappropriation
theory modeled on that of NBA v. Motorola, Inc. at least allows a
court to consider whether the "ability of other parties to free-ride on
136. See id. at 33-34.
137. See id. at 33 (noting that the effect of "collapsing the separate doctrines of trespass to
land and trespass to chattels back into their single common law progenitor... effectively creates
a brand new cause of action, unknown to modern jurisprudence").
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. h (1965); see also Burk, supra note 120, at
34-35.
139. See Burk, supra note 120, at 34-35, 43-46.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. h.
141. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98-AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *1 (Cal. App. Dep't Su-
per. Ct. April 28, 1999) ('The intrusion by Hamidi into the Intel e-mail system has resulted in
the expenditure of company resources.., to block his 'mailings,' and to address employee con-
cerns about the mailings.").
142. See generally Burk, supra note 120, at 32-37, 43-47.
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the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to
produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be
substantially threatened."'143 A metasite free-rides because it uses
the information of others to generate its own income. If the spiders
cause a burden on the system so great as to threaten the indexed
site's existence, the metasite sending the spiders may be liable for
misappropriation.
Under NBA, a defendant is liable for misappropriation when,
in addition to free-riding in a way that threatens the plaintiffs ex-
istence, "(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost;
(ii) the information is time-sensitive; .. .[and] (iv) the defendant is
in direct competition with a product or service offered by the plain-
tiffs."' Many metasites do not contain time-sensitive information
nor do they compete with the sites they index. Recall, for example,
that AuctionWatch.com indexes auction sites but does not conduct
auctions itself.145
The indexed site might argue that it competes directly with
the metasite for advertising revenue. Because a metasite offers
more effective target marketing than advertising at one particular
indexed site, the metasite, while not directly competing with a
product offered by the indexed site, does directly compete in offer-
ing the service of providing advertising space.
Elsewhere, I have suggested that a court should not find di-
rect competition unless the plaintiff and defendant compete with
each other both in providing the particular good and for the same
pool of advertising money. 146 Under this formulation, many meta-
sites would not be liable for misappropriation. 47
Of course, NBA v. Motorola, Inc. is the governing law only in
the Second Circuit that rendered the opinion and other jurisdictions
143. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
144. See id.
145. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
146. See O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 700.
147. However, this test may not allow a site that offers a product also to offer comparative
pricing information. For example, amazon.com and barnesandnoble.com compete in both the
market for the sale of books and for many of the same advertisers. Under the proposed test, the
two sites would be direct competitors. Would this prevent amazon.com from telling a customer
what the price of a desired book is on barnesandnoble.com? It might, if barnesandnoble.com is
driven out of business as a result. But shouldn't it be driven out of business if it can't meet the
price of the competition? Such indexing still might not be misappropriation if the information is
not "time-sensitive" as required by NBA. See NBA, 105 F.3d at 845. Further, the real question is
what should be labeled "free-riding" and what should not. When a site sells its own products and
offers data on other sites' prices as a point of comparison, it is simply reporting a fact. It is not
like the metasite that makes its living by indexing the content of others.
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choosing to adopt it. Some jurisdictions take a much broader view of
what constitutes misappropriation and use the term "free-riding" in
a pejorative sense to refer to any value one derives from the efforts
of others. 148
These broader views, often based on some sense of the de-
fendant's having done something morally wrong, run the risk of
copyright preemption. The data that the spiders use to build their
databases is not copyrighted. A misappropriation claim based sim-
ply on use of uncopyrightable data without the additional elements
of NBA replicates rights the spider would have under copyright and
therefore may face preemption. However, it might be useful in as-
sessing the propriety of the means of access used to obtain the in-
formation.
3. Breach of Contract
One of the cheaper technological means a site may take to
block unwanted visitors is to require all visitors to agree to a click-
wrap contract that enumerates forbidden uses. For example, eBay's
User Agreement to which one must consent before being allowed to
register, states: "Our web site contains robot exclusion headers and
you agree that you will not use any robot, spider, other automatic
device, or manual process to monitor or copy our web pages or the
content contained herein without our prior expressed written per-
mission."'149 There are, however, at least two problems for a site
seeking to stop unauthorized indexing by suing for breach of a con-
tractual term like this.
First, the spider may never see the contractual terms. Its
manner of entry may allow it to avoid clicking on the "I agree" but-
ton that indicates its consent to the terms of the click-wrap. More
imaginative modes of seeking agreement-like placing a legend on
the home page providing that any use of the site constitutes agree-
ment to the terms and conditions regardless of the user's actual
knowledge of them-may not be enforceable under contract law. 150
148. See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Iln. 1983)
(holding, in a pre-NBA case, that a board of trade could not base a stock index future contract on
the Dow Jones index without permission from Dow Jones, despite the lack of direct competition).
149. User Agreement, T 7, (Mar. 10, 2000), http://pages.ebay.com/help/Community/png-
user.html.
150. It might, however, be enforceable in jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Com-
puter Information Transactions Act ('UCITA"). See O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 691-92 (discussing
the enforceability of boilerplate legends forbidding linking under draft UCC Article 2B, UCITA's
predecessor).
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Further, even if a contract could be formed in this way, a
court may hold a particular term unconscionable. Professor Reich-
man and Jonathan Franklin suggest a doctrine of public interest
unconscionability under which "[a]ll mass-market contracts, non-
negotiable access contracts, and contracts imposing non-negotiable
restrictions on uses of computerized information goods must be
made on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, with due regard
for the public interest in . . . preservation of competition." 151 The
blanket exclusion of spiders employed by shopbots may hamper
competition by restricting the flow of pricing information.
Second, even if the contractual term passes muster under
contract law, it may be preempted by copyright law, although at
least one recent decision suggests otherwise. 15 2 Since there is no
copyright right to employ spiders, surrendering one's ability to use
a spider under contract law does not implicate a "right[ ] equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright"
as required before preemption may occur.153
However, to the extent that the effect of enforcement of the
contractual provision would be to prohibit the entire public from
engaging in the use of uncopyrightable information, it may be pre-
empted not by the Copyright Act, but by the Constitution. Assum-
ing that once on the site, a visitor is restricted in its use of informa-
tion only by the copyright law, the prohibition on the use of spiders
removes from the visitor one way of exercising its right to use the
information. That other means, like indexing the site's content
manually, 154 exist, would not necessarily save the term from pre-
emption. 155
151. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 875, 930 (1999).
152. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc. ('Ticketmaster r), 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1344,
1347 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that because "the contract claim alleges adherence by Tickets to a
contract not to use for commercial purposes," that claim is "possibly" not preempted). This court
also noted that that the claim that the contract prohibits deep linking is not preempted. See id.
These statements have limited value because the court issued a new order in August that super-
seded the prior cited one. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc. ('Ticketmaster It'), No.
CV99-7654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994). The statute also requires that the rights at issue "come
within the subject matter of copyright' for preemption to occur. Id. § 301(b)(1).
154. EBay would prohibit even manual efforts to index its site's contents. See supra note 149
and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160, 167 (1989)
(holding a Florida statute, prohibiting one way of duplicating boat hulls, was preempted by the
federal Patent Act).
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The preemption argument is not particularly strong, in part
because at least until the DMCA, copyright law has never governed
the permissible means by which one may obtain copyrighted infor-
mation. Under current law, doctrines on contractual formation and
enforcement (including unconscionability), will likely govern prom-
ises not to use spiders to access a web site. Contract law could bene-
fit from a delineation of what factors should be relevant in deter-
mining whether, if an agreement is formed under traditional doc-
trine, the particular promise should be enforceable. Similar factors
could also inform the question of the propriety of spidering in the
absence of an agreement.
IV. ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED SPIDERING AND
CONSIDERING THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Unauthorized Spidering
The policy review revealed that, in considering how to ad-
dress claims that spiders should not be permitted to access and in-
dex the product and pricing information of a publicly available web
site, the public benefit and private burden to the indexed site are
relevant. None of the causes of action above, established in the
physical world, really addresses these concerns in a systematic way.
As Professor Burk notes, because nuisance law allows a
weighing of public and private interests, it, rather than trespass,
may provide the best property analogy to use in evaluating not
simply spiders, but all unwanted access of web sites. Unlike tres-
pass, nuisance imposes liability on the unwanted visitor only if the
costs of the intrusion outweigh its benefits. 156 This implies a bal-
ancing test. The key question in formulating such a test (regardless
of whether or not one eventually places the label "nuisance" on it),
is what benefits and costs should be legally cognizable in address-
ing claims of unauthorized access?
The NBA test provides a starting point. Courts applying that
test consider whether "plaintiff generates or gathers information at
a cost." Likewise, courts addressing claims of unauthorized access
should consider: (i) the burden to the objecting site of processing
unwanted requests because that imposition represents the direct
costs of the unwanted access; (ii) whether the site loses revenue on
which it depends for its existence as a result of the access; and (iii)
the cost to the objecting site to gather the information the visitor is
156. See Burk, supra note 120, at 53.
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taking and eventually using because this cost represents part of the
free-riding benefit accruing to the visitor. 15 7
Under the NBA test, courts also evaluate whether or not the
plaintiff and defendant are in direct competition, and whether the
particular free-riding at issue would so reduce incentives as to
threaten the existence or quality of the product. Similarly, courts
assessing claims of unauthorized access should consider the pur-
pose for which the unauthorized visit is conducted, the nature of
the information taken, 58 and whether the activity would threaten
the site's existence or quality. Additionally, they should determine
whether the visitor's eventual end use of that information is in di-
rect competition with the visited site. Access to extract uncopy-
righted data to market in direct competition with the visited site is
less sympathetic than access and copying that results in a new
product.
If there are some benefits from the unauthorized access,
courts should also consider whether any less intrusive but cost-
effective means exist for the unwanted visitor to obtain the infor-
mation it desires. This question ultimately reduces to deciding
whether the particular technology the unwanted visitor is using is
best developed by a finding of liability that effectively places control
over it in the hands of the objecting site.
Finally, courts may creatively fashion remedies. When the
public enjoys a substantial benefit from the unauthorized access, a
court might appropriately allow it to continue but require the un-
wanted visitor to pay for the costs its access imposes. This would
allow courts to safeguard the incentives of the visited site.
Under this test, a shopbot's unwanted spider would likely es-
cape liability unless it so burdens the site as to threaten its very
existence. The pro-competitive benefits that the spider's use of the
uncopyrighted information offers would likely outweigh the cost to
the system from processing its requests. There is, however, a ques-
tion as to whether the shopbot could cost-effectively use less intru-
157. Copyright law would not consider this third cost in considering whether an infringe-
ment has occurred. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-54
(1991) (rejecting the argument that "sweat of the brow" alone justifies granting copyright protec-
tion). As the question turns to permissible access, and the forum to the Internet, courts should
consider these costs, in part because the relevant cause of action is more one sounding in misap-
propriation than in copyright.
158. Copyright law, including the DMCA, would govern the unwanted access and use of
copyrighted information. Whether it has struck the balance appropriately is generally a question
beyond the scope of this Article that deals only with access to copyrighted information as a step
in extracting the uncopyrightable.
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sive means to obtain that information. EBay, for example, argues
that Bidder's Edge could equally effectively obtain the information
it seeks by running real-time searches rather than using spiders.
This fact (if true), while not determinative, should factor into the
court's balance.
But some unwanted spiders may not escape liability. There
are many ways that one site may seek to profit from the data of an-
other. For example, a newsbot might allow a user to indicate that it
would like the financial pages of the Wall Street Journal and the
sports section of the New York Post. A newsbot could provide a user
with such a personalized newspaper. But (assuming the newsbot
presented only uncopyrighted, factual information), if the newspa-
pers make money by advertising and users now never see the ads,
the newsbot may seriously threaten the site's revenue model-and
not because it offers a lower priced product of its own. In such a
case, the balancing test may tip to holding the newsbot liable.
Similarly, a shopbot aggregator 59 that employs unauthorized
spiders to build its database of comparison pricing information may
not survive the test. The aggregator is in direct competition with
the sites it indexes, providing the same information and seeking the
same advertising dollars. It may very well threaten the existence of
individual shopbots, even though its own aggregation cannot suc-
ceed without those shopbots.
If a site were to erect a higher barrier to entry than a robot
exclusion to protect its uncopyrightable data-one that would be a
"technological measure" under the DMCA-a court should still use
the balancing test set forth above when that measure is effectively
protecting against access to and use of uncopyrightable data. How-
ever, the burden of proof should be placed on the unwanted visitor
to demonstrate that the test weighs in its favor. This recognizes the
blocking site's interest in protecting its investment in blocking
technology and, by extension, its heightened desire to keep out cer-
tain visitors.
B. The Normative Framework
The way in which one answers the essential question of who
should have what rights and privileges in accessing a web site re-
veals much about the normative framework to which one sub-
scribes. The choices are essentially three: (i) a system in which us-
159. Recall that a shopbot aggregator is one that gathers the data of a number of pure shop-
bots. See supra notes 11 and 19 and accompanying text.
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ers have unfettered access to sites; (ii) a strong property rights re-
gime premised on a real property analogy that allows a site owner
to exclude whomever it wants for whatever reason; and (ii') a re-
gime of divided entitlements in which web site owners have certain
property rights but users also have certain privileges. The nui-
sance-like regime suggested above subscribes to the third.
The notion that the web should be openly accessible to all
has some appeal. Public funds helped to establish the standards
that allow the web to function and paid for much of its infrastruc-
ture. The raison d'etre of the web is to connect many users, and
there is something intuitively disturbing about a web site owner
who fragments the network by restricting access to some.
But if web sites are required by law to allow the public to en-
ter using whatever means of access is available with copyright law
providing the only limiting principle, the web will lose some of its
flexibility. For example, a site could not use a subscription based
revenue model if it were not legally entitled to keep out those who
have not paid. Giving sites at least some ability to regulate access
would allow the Internet to accommodate a variety of different
types of web sites.
Certainly, one may make economic arguments that sites
should have a relatively unfettered right to exclude analogous to
that of owners of real property. 160 For example, the law could grant
sites the entitlement to ban access for the purpose of indexing. If a
site opts out of allowing indexing altogether or permits it only se-
lectively, this sends a market signal for consumers to interpret. Be-
cause a site generally has an incentive to attract the maximum
number of customers, its policy toward indexing must reflect that
which is efficient both for it and its customers. Moreover, if a site is
entitled to determine who indexes it, it can provide better service
because its systems would never be overburdened by unauthorized
spiders.
Further, a rule like this would not impose an insuperable ob-
stacle to metasites. Transaction costs are low enough on the Inter-
net to facilitate metasites' contacting and negotiating with the tar-
160. See generally Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217, 259-60 (1996) (arguing, inter alia, that lower transaction costs and the ease of
defining boundaries in cyberspace justify a strong property rights regime there); I. Trotter
Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L., (last visited Sep. 18,
2000) http:lwww.wm.edullaw/publicationsljol/hardy/html (reviewing various theories of property
and concluding that they support both treating web sites as property, and applying trespass to
them).
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get sites for permission to index before doing so. Additionally, by
requiring metasites to seek permission first, the law would force
them to internalize the costs that they impose. 161 Moreover, the site
owner would not have to incur the costs of erecting a fence that the
law might or might not respect.
The problem, of course, is that it is quite difficult to know at
this point whether or not these economic assertions are true in
practice. The earlier analysis revealed that sites may be more con-
cerned with limiting competition than enhancing aggregate effi-
ciency. This renders questionable the assumption that a site's in-
dexing policy is necessarily efficient. Additionally, transaction costs
might be much higher than anticipated. 162 For example, as auction
sites proliferate, it may become quite costly for Bidder's Edge to
obtain permission from each one that it seeks to index. Finally, the
public interest in access to information likely exceeds its interest in
accessing another's tangible real or personal property. The ques-
tion really is on which side of the coin-strong or weak property
rights-should the law err at the beginning stages of a new tech-
nology? The answer is a close one.
Because we know so little about the direction in which tech-
nology will develop and because incentives are not always aligned
optimally to ensure efficient licensing, a cautious approach to prop-
erty rights may be appropriate. Effectively giving control over the
development of technology to one or a few firms through the grant
of strong exclusionary rights may impede its efficient exploitation.
The high cost of litigation generally and its strategic direction may
hamper the emergence of competitors.
Throughout history, many countries, including the United
States, have found weak property rights useful particularly in the
early stages of a new industry. As that industry develops, the pres-
sure for stronger rights to protect the new base of knowledge grows.
While the analogy is not direct because the Internet may be the ul-
timate cross-jurisdictional industrial tool, it lends support to the
idea that weaker rights may help a more vibrant network to de-
velop.
As more information becomes available about how Internet
markets work and how firms and consumers behave there, the law
161. See Burk, supra note 120, at 49 (Typically, external costs imposed upon a common re-
source may be internalized by creating private property interests that give users an incentive to
consider the full cost of their usage, or seek permission to impose usage costs upon the property
of another.").
162. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 152-58 (1999).
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can make more reasoned choices about how it wishes to provide the
appropriate incentive structure for both innovation and competition
on the Internet. This may eventually result in stronger and more
certain property rights. But to implement them now may effectively
place costly restrictions on a developing marketplace that hamper
both innovation and competition.
CONCLUSION
The Internet and its technology offer the potential to trans-
form the way in which retailing is conducted and to shift some bar-
gaining power from producers to consumers. The law therefore
must carefully scrutinize claims by sites that seek to restrict access
to software tools that would help this shift to occur. It must sepa-
rate sites' "legitimate" motivations from their anti-competitive ones
and consider how best to balance legally cognizable private harms
against the public benefit.
Merely applying existing law by analogy is unsatisfactory
because it lacks an appropriate sensitivity to the unique character-
istics and opportunities of the Internet. By understanding what mo-
tivates sites, the law can formulate a cause of action that addresses
questions of unauthorized access on the Internet more effectively.
As time and technology march forward, the real question will be
how to implement flexible legal rules that can deal with the myriad
of ways in which information is accessed and used on the Internet.
This Article starts the debate with a proposed balancing test to ad-
dress unauthorized access to obtain uncopyrighted information, but
its main contribution is to remind Internet users of all types that
the law has a major role to play in shaping competition in this still
relatively new medium.
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